

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JEREME PARRISH GOLTZ,

Defendant.

No. CR03-0035-LRR

No. C05-0097-LRR

ORDER

This matter comes before the court on the defendant's motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence (Docket No. 65). The defendant filed his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.¹

I. BACKGROUND

On May 8, 2003, the government filed an indictment against the defendant. On November 20, 2003, the government filed an information. On the same day, the defendant filed a waiver of indictment. On November 24, 2003, the defendant appeared before Chief Magistrate Judge John A. Jarvey for a change of plea hearing. At such hearing, the

¹ If a prisoner is in custody pursuant to a sentence imposed by a federal court and such prisoner claims "that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, [the prisoner] may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. *See also Daniels v. United States*, 532 U.S. 374, 377, 121 S. Ct. 1578, 149 L. Ed. 2d 590 (2001).

defendant pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the manufacture or attempted manufacture of 5 grams or more of actual methamphetamine.² On the same day, Chief Magistrate Judge John A. Jarvey entered a report and recommendation that a United States District Court Judge accept the defendant's plea of guilty. On December 9, 2003, the court entered an order adopting the report and recommendation pertaining to the defendant's guilty plea. On June 4, 2004, the court sentenced the defendant to 102 months imprisonment and 4 years supervised release. On the same day, judgment entered against the defendant. The defendant did not file an appeal.

On April 27, 2005, the defendant filed a motion to correct judgment pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. On April 28, 2005, the court denied that motion.

On May 31, 2005, the defendant filed the instant motion. In his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the defendant challenges his conviction and resulting sentence on several grounds. Specifically, the defendant asserts: 1) his counsel did not provide effective assistance; 2) his sentence violates *United States v. Booker*, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005); and 3) he involuntarily entered his guilty plea. On June 15, 2005, the defendant filed a motion for leave to file a supplement to his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. On June 29, 2005, the court granted that motion. On October 17, 2005, the defendant filed a supplement to his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.

The court now turns to consider the defendant's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

² Such conduct is in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standards Applicable to Motion Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255

28 U.S.C. § 2255 allows a prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court to move the sentencing court to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence. To obtain relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner must establish: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. *See Hill v. United States*, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255).

Although it appears to be broad, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not provide a remedy for “all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.” *United States v. Addonizio*, 442 U.S. 178, 185, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979). Rather, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is intended to redress only “fundamental defect[s] which inherently [result] in a complete miscarriage of justice” and “omission[s] inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” *Hill*, 368 U.S. at 428. *See also United States v. Apfel*, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice.”) (citing *Poor Thunder v. United States*, 810 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1987)). A collateral challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is not interchangeable or substitutable for a direct appeal. *See United States v. Frady*, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982) (making clear a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 will not be allowed to do service for an appeal). Consequently, “[a]n error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not

necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In addition, defendants ordinarily are precluded from asserting claims they failed to raise on direct appeal. *See McNeal v. United States*, 249 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 2001). “A defendant who has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review may raise the claim in a [28 U.S.C. §] 2255 proceeding only by demonstrating cause for the default and prejudice or actual innocence.” *Id.* (citing *Bousley v. United States*, 523 U.S. 614, 622, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998)). *See also Massaro v. United States*, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003) (“[T]he general rule [is] that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the [defendant] shows cause and prejudice.”). “[C]ause’ under the cause and prejudice test must be something *external* to the [defendant], something that cannot be fairly attributed to him.” *Coleman v. Thompson*, 501 U.S. 722, 753, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991) (emphasis in original). If a defendant fails to show cause, a court need not consider whether actual prejudice exists. *McCleskey v. Zant*, 499 U.S. 467, 501, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1991). Actual innocence under the actual innocence test “means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” *Bousley*, 523 U.S. at 623-24. *See also McNeal*, 249 F.3d at 749 (“[A] defendant must show factual innocence, not simply legal insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction.”).³

³ The procedural default rule applies to a conviction obtained through trial or through the entry of a guilty plea. *See United States v. Cain*, 134 F.3d 1345, 1352 (8th Cir. 1998); *Walker v. United States*, 115 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 1997); *Matthews v. United States*, 114 F.3d 112, 113 (8th Cir. 1997); *Thomas v. United States*, 112 F.3d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1997); *Reid v. United States*, 976 F.2d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1992).

B. The Defendant's Claims

The defendant's reliance on *United States v. Booker*, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), to challenge his conviction and resulting sentence is unavailing. In *Booker*, the Supreme Court concluded the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant. *Booker*, ___ U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 756, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 650 (applying its decisions in *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and *Blakely v. Washington*, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). Nonetheless, on July 7, 2005, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined "the 'new rule' announced in *Booker* does not apply to criminal convictions that became final before the rule was announced, and thus does not benefit movants in collateral proceedings." *Never Misses A Shot v. United States*, 413 F.3d 781, 783-84 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, any of the defendant's claims which rely on *United States v. Booker*, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), shall be dismissed.

With respect to the defendant's remaining claims, the United States Attorney and the defendant shall respond in the following manner:

1. The United States Attorney for the Northern District of Iowa shall move or plead to the defendant's remaining claims by February 10, 2006.
2. The defendant shall reply to the government's response, if he so chooses, by March 3, 2006.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:


1) The defendant's claims which rely on *United States v. Booker*, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), are dismissed.

2) The United States Attorney and the defendant are directed to respond in the following manner:

1. The United States Attorney for the Northern District of Iowa shall move or plead to the defendant's remaining claims by February 10, 2006.

2. The defendant shall reply to the government's response, if he so chooses, by March 3, 2006.

DATED this 12th day of December, 2005.



LINDA R. READE
JUDGE, U. S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA